News
DN
NoodleNews
ANALYSIS
04 JUL 2026
Technology · AI & energy

AI is still a small slice of the world’s electricity

Data centres used about 1.5% of global electricity in 2024, and AI only a fraction of that. The load is growing fast and set to roughly double by 2030 — yet even then it would add less new demand than cooling or electric cars. The same pattern holds for the carbon and water that come with it: individually tiny per query, modest in the global total, but concentrated enough to bite locally.

415TWh
Electricity used by data centres worldwide, 2024
1.5%
Their share of global electricity in 2024
~15%
Of that used by AI-focused servers, 2024
The measured footprint

Big enough to notice, small enough to keep in proportion

In 2024, the world’s data centres consumed roughly 415 terawatt-hours of electricity — about 1.5% of global supply.1 Servers running AI accounted for an estimated 15% of that, so AI itself was on the order of a fifth of a percent of world electricity.1 The load is also concentrated: the United States, China and Europe together made up about 85% of it, with the US alone at 45% (some 180 TWh).1

It is rising quickly. Data-centre electricity use has grown around 12% a year since 2017, several times faster than total electricity demand,1 and the IEA’s central projection has it more than doubling to about 945 TWh by 2030 and near 1,200 TWh by 2035.1 Those later figures are forecasts, not measurements — and the spread across the IEA’s scenarios is wide.

Exhibit 01
Data-centre electricity: measured to 2024, then a widening forecast
Source: IEA, Energy and AI (2025).1 Solid line is measured (2024); the 2017 point is derived from the IEA’s 2024 level and its stated ~12%/yr growth. Dashed line is the IEA Base Case; the shaded cone spans the 2035 sensitivity range, from the Headwinds case (~700 TWh) to the Lift-Off case (~1,700 TWh). Units: TWh.
Key finding. In 2024, data centres drew about 1.5% of the world’s electricity, and AI roughly a sixth of that — a fraction of one percent of global power. The alarming totals in circulation are projections.
In context

What AI actually adds to the grid, next to everything else

The most useful way to size the “cost to the grid” is not the data-centre total but how much new demand it adds against other growing uses. On the IEA’s central case, data centres account for under 10% of the growth in global electricity demand between 2024 and 2030.1 Their roughly 530 TWh of added demand is less than the growth expected from electric cars or from cooling, and far below industry.7

Exhibit 02
Where new electricity demand comes from, 2024–2030 (projected)
Source: IEA Energy and AI Base Case, as reported by Carbon Brief.7 All four bars are projected growth in annual electricity demand over 2024–2030, not present-day levels. Data centres (highlighted) add about the same as the gap between the others. Units: TWh added.

None of this means the build-out is costless. Because data centres cluster — nearly half of US capacity sits in five regional hubs1 — they can dominate a local grid even while barely moving the global figure. In the US, they are set to drive close to half of all electricity-demand growth to 2030,1 against a backdrop where total demand is climbing again after years of stagnation: the IEA expects world consumption to rise from about 28,200 TWh in 2025 to 33,600 TWh by 2030.2

The carbon that comes with it

A small share of emissions — but one of the few still rising

Generating the electricity for data centres produced roughly 180 million tonnes of CO₂ in 2024 — about 0.5% of energy-related emissions.37 On the IEA’s projections that share climbs to around 1% by 2030 in the central case, or about 1.4% under faster growth.7 Modest in absolute terms — but notable because data centres are one of the few sectors where emissions are still expected to grow, even as power grids decarbonise.7

The pressure is concentrated in a handful of firms. Google’s total greenhouse-gas emissions rose by about half between 2019 and 2024 as AI and data-centre demand grew;4 Google and Meta each now report several million tonnes of scope 1 and 2 emissions from their operations.6 Company reporting is also contested: a Guardian analysis argued that big-tech data-centre emissions in 2020–2022 were several times higher than officially reported, largely a function of how clean-energy purchases are counted.10

Exhibit 03
Data centres’ share of global energy-related CO₂
Source: IEA, via Carbon Brief.7 The 2024 bar (highlighted) is measured; the two 2030 bars are IEA scenarios, not measurements. Units: % of energy-related CO₂.
The water, and the size of one query

Five drops a prompt — but that depends where you draw the line

Data centres also use water, mostly for cooling. Globally the IEA puts data-centre water consumption at about 560 billion litres in 2023.3 At the level of a single request, Google’s own production measurement finds a median Gemini text prompt uses about 0.24 watt-hours of electricity, emits 0.03 g of CO₂, and consumes 0.26 millilitres of water — roughly five drops, and less energy than nine seconds of television.5

That number is unusually well-measured, but it counts only on-site cooling water, not the water used to generate the electricity itself; nor does it include model training, networks or your device.5 Draw the boundary differently and the per-query figure moves by orders of magnitude — earlier public estimates ran to 45–50 mL a prompt.5 As with electricity, the individual number is tiny; the aggregate and the location are what matter. Two-thirds of US data centres built or under construction since 2022 sit in areas of high water stress, and US data-centre water use is projected to reach 150–280 billion litres by 2028.6

Exhibit 04
The same activity, at three scales
Per…ElectricityCO₂Water
One median text prompt0.24 Wh0.03 g0.26 mL
One million prompts240 kWh30 kg260 L
All data centres, 2024415 TWh~180 Mt~560 bn L
Sources: per-prompt from Google’s production measurement;5 system totals from the IEA (electricity and CO₂ 2024; water 2023).13 The denominators differ: a prompt is one Gemini text query (on-site cooling water only), while the system total covers all data-centre workloads — of which AI is roughly 15%. This is a sense of scale, not a like-for-like ratio.
What we don’t know

Today’s figures are themselves uncertain: definitions differ, and the IEA’s own baseline has shifted between reports as boundaries (for example, whether crypto mining is counted) changed. AI’s slice is disputed — the IEA’s ~15% share for 2024 is judged an underestimate by some researchers.8 Per-query footprints depend heavily on what is counted: cooling water versus power-generation water, market-based versus location-based carbon, and whether training and networks are included.9 The biggest unknown is efficiency: whether gains in chips, software and cooling offset rising use is the difference between the IEA’s ~700 TWh and ~1,700 TWh outcomes for 2035.1

Where it’s contested

How heavy is the footprint of a single query?

Credible sources genuinely disagree — not about values, but about the measurement.

Tiny and falling

Measured in production, a median text prompt uses about five drops of water and less energy than nine seconds of TV, and Google reports the per-prompt energy and carbon of that query fell 33-fold and 44-fold in a single year as models and hardware improved.5

Empirical dispute
Understated

Those figures omit the water used to generate the power, along with training, networks and devices, and lean on market-based carbon accounting — so the true footprint is higher, and the aggregate load in water-stressed regions is what counts.96

Empirical dispute

Both can be true at once: a single query is genuinely small and getting smaller, while the total across billions of queries and non-AI workloads is large and concentrated. The unresolved part is the accounting boundary — and, until disclosure is standardised, reasonable estimates will differ.

By the numbers · measured, 2024
45%
Of data-centre electricity is in the US1
85%
In the US, China and Europe combined1
12%/yr
Average growth since 20171
4.4%
Share of US electricity in 2023 (LBNL)4
Caveat. The “1.5% of world electricity” framing is accurate but can mislead about local strain. Because the load concentrates in a handful of hubs, and because grid connections and transformers take years to build, a modest global share can still translate into acute regional bottlenecks — the IEA estimates about 20% of planned data-centre projects risk delay on current trends.1
Go deeper

Read more

Two threads left out to hold length.

Method. Hero figures and the stat band are measured 2024 values from the IEA. Exhibit 01 plots the IEA’s measured 2024 level (415 TWh); the 2017 anchor is computed from that level and the IEA’s stated ~12%/yr five-year growth (415 ÷ 1.12⁷ ≈ 188 TWh) and labelled as derived. The dashed segment is the IEA Base Case (945 TWh in 2030; ~1,200 TWh in 2035); the shaded cone is the IEA’s 2035 sensitivity range (Headwinds ~700 TWh to Lift-Off ~1,700 TWh). Exhibit 02 shows projected growth in annual demand by sector, 2024–2030 (IEA Base Case) — all four bars are forecasts, flagged as such. Exhibit 03 shows the measured 2024 CO₂ share (0.5%) with two IEA 2030 scenarios (1.0% central, 1.4% faster). Exhibit 04 scales Google’s measured median-prompt figures linearly (×10⁶) and sets them beside IEA system totals; per-prompt and system denominators differ and it is not a like-for-like ratio. Derived figures were computed and cross-checked in code (for example, 945 − 415 = 530 TWh, matching the data-centre growth bar; 0.24 Wh × 10⁶ = 240 kWh). Projections are excluded from every hero figure.
Sources. Highest tier first; each inline citation resolves here.
  1. T1IEA, Energy and AI (2025) — data-centre consumption, shares, AI split, regional, CO₂ and sensitivity figures. iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  2. T1IEA, Electricity 2026 (2026) — global demand levels and growth. iea.org/reports/electricity-2026. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  3. T1Ren et al., “The carbon and water footprints of data centers,” Patterns (Cell Press, peer-reviewed, 2025), reporting IEA estimates — ~180 Mt CO₂ (2024) and ~560 bn L water (2023). Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  4. T2Brookings, “Global energy demands within the AI regulatory landscape” (2026), citing DOE/Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory — US data-centre share (2023) and Google emissions trend. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  5. T2Google, “Measuring the environmental impact of delivering AI at Google scale” (technical paper, 2025) — per-prompt energy, CO₂ and water; efficiency gains. Operator-reported; transparent methodology. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  6. T2IIGCC, “AI and data centres: climate and nature risks for investors” (2026) — US water projection to 2028, water-stress siting, company scope 1–2 emissions. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  7. T3Carbon Brief, “Five charts that put data-centre energy use into context” (2025) — IEA sector-growth values, CO₂ shares (0.5% in 2024; 1.0%/1.4% in 2030) and scenario range. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  8. T3Scientific American (2025) — independent view (A. de Vries) that the IEA’s AI share is likely an underestimate. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  9. T3The Verge, via Data Center Dynamics (2025) — critique (S. Ren, UC Riverside) that per-prompt figures omit indirect water and use market-based carbon. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
  10. T3Guardian analysis (2024) — big-tech data-centre emissions in 2020–2022 reported as several times higher than official figures. Retrieved 4 Jul 2026.
Corrections. None. Material corrections will be logged here with date.
Figures to 04 Jul 2026. Noodle News · v1.1 · ai-grid-cost · v1.1 adds carbon, water and per-query context.