Nine in ten treated patients are free of the crises that defined their disease, and the effect has now lasted more than five years. Yet in the ten countries where the therapy is licensed, over 60,000 people are eligible — and 64 were infused in 2025.
On 8 December 2023 the US Food and Drug Administration approved Casgevy (exagamglogene autotemcel) for sickle cell disease in patients 12 and older — the first medicine anywhere to use CRISPR/Cas9 genome editing.1 It does not repair the sickle mutation. Instead it edits a patient’s own blood stem cells at the erythroid enhancer of the BCL11A gene, releasing a brake on fetal haemoglobin — the oxygen-carrying form present before birth — so that it is produced again in adult red blood cells.3
The measured results are unusually clean for a first-in-class therapy. In the completed pivotal trial (CLIMB SCD-121, a single-arm, open-label phase 3 study in patients aged 12 to 35 with at least two severe crises in each of the two prior years), 29 of 30 evaluable patients — 96.7% — had no severe vaso-occlusive crisis for at least 12 consecutive months, and all 30 avoided hospitalisation for one over the same period.4
Longer follow-up has not eroded the effect. In data presented to the American Society of Hematology, 39 of 42 evaluable sickle cell patients (93%) were crisis-free for at least 12 months, and 53 of 54 evaluable thalassemia patients (98%) became transfusion-independent for at least 12 months. The longest follow-up now runs beyond five years, with fetal haemoglobin levels and allelic editing stable over time.5
Even the shortfall is instructive. Of the three sickle cell patients who did not reach the endpoint, Vertex reports that each still cut their rate of hospitalisation for crises — by 91%, 71% and 100% respectively.5 This is a therapy whose failures still look like substantial clinical benefit.
In 2023 there was one approved gene-editing medicine. By mid-2026 there are four distinct modalities with human data, and they differ in ways that matter for access.
Ex vivo cutting is Casgevy’s approach: remove cells, edit outside the body, put them back. Ex vivo base editing rewrites a single DNA letter without cutting both strands. Beam Therapeutics’ risto-cel (ristoglogene autogetemcel, formerly BEAM-101) uses it to raise fetal haemoglobin in sickle cell; interim BEACON phase 1/2 data covering 31 patients, with follow-up from 0.3 to 20.4 months, were published in the New England Journal of Medicine.11
In vivo editing dispenses with the cell-collection step entirely: the editor is infused and finds its target inside the patient. Intellia’s lonvo-z reported the first positive phase 3 result for any in vivo gene-editing therapy in April 2026, cutting monthly hereditary angioedema attacks by 87% against placebo, with 62% of treated patients free of both attacks and therapy over six months versus 11% on placebo.8 Fourth, and most novel, is the bespoke, one-patient therapy.
That fourth form is the one that changes the shape of the problem. In August 2024 an infant known as KJ Muldoon was born with severe carbamoyl phosphate synthetase 1 (CPS1) deficiency, a urea-cycle disorder that lets ammonia accumulate to levels that damage the brain or kill. He was too small for the standard treatment, a liver transplant. A team at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and Penn Medicine designed, manufactured and administered a base-editing therapy targeted at his specific variant, delivered to the liver in lipid nanoparticles. He received the first infusion on 25 February 2025, aged between six and seven months; the case was reported in the New England Journal of Medicine that May.6
A year on, CHOP reported that KJ was walking and talking.7 The clinically important qualifier is that he was not cured: his physicians describe a much milder form of the disease rather than its elimination, and one clinician has publicly credited his outcome substantially to a neonatologist who checked his ammonia at 36 hours old, before any editing was contemplated.7 A single patient cannot establish efficacy. What the case establishes is a timeline: roughly six months from identifying a private mutation to infusing a drug made for one person.
Vertex reports more than 60,000 eligible patients across the ten countries where Casgevy is licensed — approximately 37,000 in North America and Europe, and more than 23,000 in the Middle East.2 Against that denominator, the treated numerator is small enough to be startling. In the whole of 2025, 64 people worldwide received a Casgevy infusion, 30 of them in the fourth quarter. Over the same year, 147 people had a first cell collection.2 Cumulatively, by the first quarter of 2026, more than 500 people globally had begun the treatment journey at all.9
Those 500 are about 0.8% of the eligible population in countries where the therapy is actually approved. The 64 infused in 2025 are 0.11% — roughly one in every 938 eligible people.
The global denominator is larger still. The FDA puts the US sickle cell population at roughly 100,000.1 Beam Therapeutics, citing global estimates, puts the number living with sickle cell worldwide at about eight million — concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and India, where Casgevy is not licensed, where authorised treatment centres do not exist, and where, as researchers writing in The CRISPR Journal have argued, even hydroxyurea — a generic approved in 1998 — remains out of reach for most patients.12 The 60,000 eligible are, on that estimate, well under 1% of the people who have the disease.
The intuitive explanation for a 0.11% treatment rate is that there is nowhere to go and no one to pay. Both are weaker than they look.
On geography: Vertex reported more than 75 activated authorised treatment centres in the United States alone as of 1 July 2026, having earlier passed 65 globally against a target of about 75.3 On payment: as of the end of 2025, approximately 90% of US patients had reimbursed access to Casgevy, which is also reimbursed in the UK, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait, with Scotland added in January 2026.2
This is the desk’s reading, not a sourced causal finding: if roughly nine in ten American patients can have it paid for, and there are more than 75 places to receive it, then the near-term constraint in approved markets is chiefly the clinical pathway itself rather than the list price or the map. The label makes the pathway explicit. Stem cells must be mobilised and collected by apheresis, often over multiple cycles; hydroxyurea must stop at least eight weeks beforehand; the patient then undergoes full myeloablative conditioning with busulfan — chemotherapy that destroys the existing bone marrow — before infusion and engraftment. Every treated patient in the trials experienced grade 3 or 4 neutropenia and thrombocytopenia; mucositis and febrile neutropenia were the commonest severe reactions; and infertility has been observed with the conditioning.15
Reporting by STAT attributes the slow rollout substantially to difficulties collecting enough stem cells, and notes that inpatient conditioning capacity has been a rate-limiting step.13 That account is consistent with the company’s own numbers: 147 first cell collections in 2025 produced 64 infusions in the same year. Vertex is now advancing preclinical work on gentler conditioning, which it says could broaden the eligible population.2
Vertex set Casgevy’s US list price at $2.2m; bluebird bio priced its non-CRISPR competitor Lyfgenia at $3.1m.14 The list price covers the edited cells, not the apheresis, conditioning, inpatient stay or follow-up around them.
Vertex also reports that people with sickle cell and recurrent crises in the US face a median age of death of about 45, and those with transfusion-dependent thalassemia about 37.3 Casgevy generated $115.8m of revenue in 2025, against $10.0m in 2024.2 That is a rounding error for a company with $12.0bn of total revenue — which is itself part of the story: at current throughput, a cure for two diseases is not yet a business, and the incentive to solve the pathway is commercial as well as moral.
Vertex does not publish a cumulative count of people ever infused with Casgevy; only the 2025 annual figure (64) and cumulative journeys initiated (“more than 500”) are disclosed, so the total treated population since launch cannot be stated precisely here. Those two disclosures also sit awkwardly against STAT’s February 2026 report of about 60 patients treated in total across the US, Middle East and Europe — a figure lower than the company’s 64 infusions for 2025 alone; the scope and timing of the two counts have not been publicly reconciled, and we have not resolved it.13 Durability beyond about five to six years is unmeasured: the long-term follow-up study, CLIMB-131, runs to 15 years and has not reported. The clinical significance of potential off-target editing is stated by the FDA label to be unknown.15 Eligible-population counts are company estimates, not registry data. No published study isolates the causes of slow uptake, so the weight of apheresis failure, conditioning-bed capacity, patient reluctance and prior-authorisation delay cannot be apportioned. And KJ Muldoon is a single patient: his case demonstrates feasibility and speed, not efficacy, and he is improved rather than cured.7
Credible sources genuinely disagree about what limits access. The two disputes below are different in kind, and only one of them is the sort of question evidence can eventually settle.
The binding constraint in approved markets is clinical throughput, not payment. Roughly 90% of US patients have reimbursed access and more than 75 US centres are activated, yet 147 collections yielded 64 infusions in 2025.2 The pathway — multi-cycle apheresis, busulfan myeloablation, weeks of inpatient engraftment — is the rate limiter, and reporting attributes the rollout’s slowness principally to cell-collection difficulty and conditioning-bed capacity.13
Price sets the geography of the cure before throughput ever becomes the question. The 60,000 “eligible” exist only because ten wealthy countries licensed the therapy; on company-cited estimates about eight million people live with sickle cell, overwhelmingly where no centre and no licence exists. At $2.2m the therapy is arithmetically unavailable there, which is why researchers argue affordable pricing is an ethical imperative rather than a commercial preference.12
Whether a health system should spend $2.2m up front on one person, when the same sum spread differently would reach far more people, is not a question about facts. The manufacturer’s framing — that the price is below the $4–6m lifetime cost of the disease — is a cost-offset argument.3 It does not answer the distributive claim, and no amount of trial data can.
Nor can evidence settle whether a bespoke therapy for one child is a good use of a research system. KJ Muldoon’s therapy took roughly six months and a consortium of academic and industry contributors to reach one patient.6 Whether that is a template worth industrialising, or an extraordinary rescue that cannot scale, is a judgement about what medicine owes individuals versus populations.
| Measure | Value | Basis / denominator | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| SCD crisis-free ≥12 months (long-term) | 93% | 39 of 42 evaluable (92.9%) | Vertex/ASH T1 |
| SCD crisis-free ≥12 months (pivotal) | 96.7% | 29 of 30 evaluable | NEJM / CHOP T1 |
| SCD hospitalisation-free (pivotal) | 100% | 30 of 30 evaluable | NEJM / CHOP T1 |
| TDT transfusion-independent (long-term) | 98% | 53 of 54 evaluable (98.1%) | Vertex/ASH T1 |
| TDT transfusion-independent (label) | 91.4% | 32 of 35 primary efficacy set | FDA label T1 |
| TDT transfusion-independent, ages 5–11 | 89% | 8 of 9 evaluable (88.9%) | FDA / Vertex T1 |
| Longest follow-up | >5 yrs | CLIMB-131 ongoing to 15 yrs | Vertex T1 |
| Patients infused, 2025 | 64 | Worldwide; 30 in Q4 2025 | Vertex 8-K T1 |
| First cell collections, 2025 | 147 | Worldwide | Vertex 8-K T1 |
| Treatment journeys initiated | >500 | Cumulative to Q1 2026 | CRISPR Tx 8-K T1 |
| Eligible patients | >60,000 | 10 approved countries | Vertex 8-K T1 |
| — North America & Europe | ~37,000 | Company estimate | Vertex 8-K T1 |
| — Middle East | >23,000 | Company estimate | Vertex 8-K T1 |
| Infused 2025 as share of eligible | 0.11% | 64 / 60,000; ~1 in 938 | Noodle News calc. |
| Journeys started as share of eligible | 0.83% | 500 / 60,000 | Noodle News calc. |
| Activated US treatment centres | >75 | As of 1 Jul 2026 | Vertex T1 |
| US patients with reimbursed access | ~90% | As of end-2025 | Vertex 8-K T1 |
| Casgevy list price (US) | $2.2m | WAC, drug product only | BioPharma Dive T3 |
| Lyfgenia list price (US) | $3.1m | WAC; not a CRISPR therapy | BioPharma Dive T3 |
| Lifetime cost, severe SCD | $4–6m | Company estimate, US | Vertex T1 (interested) |
| Lifetime cost, TDT | $5–5.7m | Company estimate, US | Vertex T1 (interested) |
| Casgevy revenue, 2025 | $115.8m | vs $10.0m in 2024 | Vertex 8-K T1 |
| Median age of death, SCD (US) | ~45 | With recurrent crises | Vertex T1 (interested) |
| Median age of death, TDT (US) | ~37 | Company statement | Vertex T1 (interested) |
| US sickle cell population | ~100,000 | FDA estimate | FDA T1 |
| Global sickle cell population | ~8m | Company-cited estimate | Beam T2 (interested) |
| Additional US children eligible | ~5,500 | Jul 2026 label expansion, ages 2+ | Vertex / FDA T1 |
| Lonvo-z HAE attack reduction | 87% | vs placebo, wks 5–28, Ph3 HAELO | Intellia 8-K T1 |
| Lonvo-z attack- and therapy-free | 62% | vs 11% placebo, over 6 months | Intellia 8-K T1 |
| Risto-cel BEACON interim cohort | 31 | Follow-up 0.3–20.4 months | Beam / NEJM T2 |
| KJ Muldoon, first infusion | 25 Feb 2025 | Aged ~6–7 months | NEJM / CHOP T1 |