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24 JUL 2026
World · Sovereign debt

Nearly a quarter of low- and middle-income countries now spend over a fifth of revenue on interest alone

Interest payments by low- and middle-income countries have more than doubled since 2017 as a share of government revenue. The causes are contested; the arithmetic of what that leaves for health, education and infrastructure is not.

24%
Of 89 tracked low- and middle-income countries, the share spending over 20% of government revenue on interest alone in 2024 (21 countries)1
35of 68
Low-income countries the IMF rated at high risk of, or already in, debt distress, latest assessments as of Nov 20242
415$bn interest, 2024
Interest paid by all low- and middle-income countries in 2024 — 2.4× the level a decade earlier1
What the data shows

Interest alone now eats a fifth of revenue in a growing group of countries

The World Bank tracks how much of government revenue goes purely to interest — before a single dollar of principal is repaid — across 89 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) it follows closely for debt sustainability.1 In 2024, 21 of those countries spent more than a fifth of their revenue on interest; 14 spent more than a quarter; 33 spent more than 15%.1 This is a different, narrower measure than total debt service (interest plus principal) or a share of exports or GDP — this piece uses interest-to-revenue throughout and states so at each step, because the three denominators tell different stories.

Exhibit 01
Low- and middle-income countries spending over each interest-to-revenue threshold, 2024
Source: World Bank, International Debt Report 2025 data blog, "Beyond the narratives."1 Of 89 LMICs tracked for this indicator; interest payments only, not total debt service.
Key finding. In 2017, just 9 of the same 89 countries spent more than a fifth of revenue on interest. By 2024 that had risen to 21 — 2.3× as many countries, in seven years.1
How fast it moved

Interest bills have multiplied faster than economies have grown

Two World Bank tallies, on two different country groups, point the same way. Across all 89 tracked LMICs, interest payments hit $415 billion in 2024, 2.4× their level a decade earlier1 — implying roughly $173 billion a decade before, a figure this piece derives from that stated ratio rather than an independently published one. Among the 78 countries eligible for the World Bank's low-income lending arm (IDA), interest alone reached $34.6 billion in 2023, described by the Bank as four times the amount a decade earlier3 — implying roughly $8.7 billion then, again derived from the stated multiple. Both increases far outpace the modest growth most of these economies saw in revenue over the same period.

Exhibit 02
Interest payments, a decade ago vs. now — two country groups, both derived from the Bank's own stated multiples
Source: World Bank IDR 2025 blog (all-LMIC figure)1 and World Bank IDR 2024 press release (IDA figure).3 "A decade ago" values for both series are computed here from the Bank's own stated multiples (2.4× and 4×), not separately published for those exact years.
The signature exhibit

Relief, when it comes, has taken years

The G20's Common Framework, created in late 2020, was meant to give the most indebted low-income countries an orderly route to restructuring. In practice, only four countries have used it, and the process has been slow.4 Zambia requested treatment in February 2021 and reached a bondholder agreement in 2024 — roughly four years later.4 Ghana, which defaulted in December 2022, concluded its restructuring by the end of 2024.5 Sri Lanka, outside the Framework, defaulted in April 2022 and also concluded by the end of 2024.5 Ethiopia, which requested Common Framework treatment in February 2021, had not finalised its restructuring as this piece went to press.5 Every month a restructuring drags on is a month of debt service paid at the old, unsustainable terms.

Exhibit 03
From default or request to resolution — four sovereigns' restructuring timelines
Source: G20 Common Framework status notes; ODI; tralac Trade Law Centre.45 Ethiopia's span is shown running to the present because its restructuring remains unresolved — not a projection, a measured fact as of this build.
In context

Over half of the poorest countries the IMF tracks are at high risk or worse

The IMF and World Bank jointly rate low-income countries' debt sustainability on a four-step scale: low, moderate, and high risk of debt distress, or already in distress. As of the IMF's debt sustainability assessments reported in November 2024, 35 of the 68 low-income countries on the list were rated at high risk of debt distress or already in it, a further 25 at moderate risk, leaving just 8 at low risk.2 A separate, narrower IMF tally from October 2025, covering a different-sized set of 69 countries and a stricter "in distress or debt unsustainable" cut, counted 10 in that narrowest category6 — a reminder that "at risk" and "unsustainable" are not the same claim, and the count changes markedly depending which is used.

Exhibit 04
IMF/World Bank debt-distress risk ratings, low-income countries, as reported November 2024
Source: IMF Debt Sustainability Analyses, cited in OMFIF, Nov 2024.2 Low-risk figure (8) is this piece's residual: 68 total minus the 35 and 25 reported directly.
What we don't know

A consistent, single-source creditor-composition breakdown (how much of this debt is owed to bondholders, China, other bilateral lenders, and multilaterals, on one common base) could not be sourced this session: the World Bank's own reporting gives Paris Club creditors' share of "IDA PPG debt" (~10%, down from ~50% in the early 2000s) and bondholders' share of "long-term PPG external debt" across LMICs generally (~60%) — two different, not-directly-comparable denominators.1 Rather than force them into one chart, this piece states each figure with its own base and omits the Sankey exhibit a shared breakdown would have supported. Separately, this piece uses interest-to-revenue as its primary measure because that is what the clearest, most current single source (World Bank) publishes a country count against; total-debt-service-to-revenue, which would add principal repayments, is likely higher still but not published at the same country-count granularity in the sources used here. Finally, the debt-distress risk counts in Exhibit 04 are a snapshot of assessments published on a rolling basis over 2023–2025, not all struck on a single date — a genuine limitation of how the IMF/World Bank framework works, not an error in this piece's arithmetic.

Where it's contested

Whose fault, and what fixes it

That debt service now consumes a large and rising share of revenue in many low-income countries is a measured fact. Why, and what should be done about it, are both genuinely disputed.

The case for creditor-side reform

The World Bank's own analysis attributes much of the recent rise to a global interest-rate shock — the fastest major-central-bank tightening cycle in four decades — landing on countries that had no control over it, plus currency depreciation inflating the local cost of foreign-currency debt.1 Campaigners and some economists argue this points to faster, deeper multilateral relief and reform of the Common Framework, whose four cases have each taken years to resolve.4

Mixed empirical/value dispute
The case for borrower-side caution

The IMF's own framework rates most distressed low-income countries' debt as "sustainable" even at high risk, implying the existing path — fiscal adjustment plus targeted restructuring — can still work without broader relief, and that both government borrowing choices and domestic-debt build-up (which shifted markedly after 2022) are within countries' own control.26

Mixed empirical/value dispute
Caveat. The strongest objection to this piece's framing: interest-to-revenue is one defensible measure among several (export share, GDP share, total debt service), and different measures rank countries differently. A country with low interest-to-revenue but heavy near-term principal repayments falling due could still face an acute liquidity crunch that this measure alone would miss.
By the numbers
$1.4tn
Record foreign debt service paid by developing countries in 20233
$96.2bn
Total debt service paid by IDA-eligible (low-income) countries, 2023 — $34.6bn interest, $61.6bn principal3
$741bn
Net financial outflow from LMICs, 2022–2024 — the largest in 50+ years of records1
>50%
Share of low-income countries' total external debt service that is now interest alone1
Reference · the full record

The underlying figures, in full

Every figure used in this piece, with its year, its source and its tier badge.

ItemYearGroupValueSource (tier)
LMICs >20% revenue on interest201789 tracked LMICs9World Bank (T1)
LMICs >20% revenue on interest202489 tracked LMICs21World Bank (T1)
LMICs >15% / >25% revenue on interest202489 tracked LMICs33 / 14World Bank (T1)
Total LMIC interest paid2024All LMICs$415bnWorld Bank (T1)
Total LMIC interest, derived decade-ago~2014All LMICs$173bnDerived (2.4×), this desk
IDA interest paid202378 IDA countries$34.6bnWorld Bank (T1)
IDA interest, derived decade-ago~201378 IDA countries$8.7bnDerived (4×), this desk
IDA total debt service202378 IDA countries$96.2bnWorld Bank (T1)
LMIC external debt stock2023All LMICs$8.8tnWorld Bank (T1)
IDA external debt stock202478 IDA countries$1.2tnWorld Bank (T1)
LICs high risk / in distressNov 202468 LICs on IMF list35IMF via OMFIF (T2)
LICs moderate / low riskNov 202468 LICs on IMF list25 / 8IMF via OMFIF (T2)
LICs "in distress or unsustainable" (narrower cut)Oct 202569 LICs, different list10IMF (T1)
Go deeper

Read more

Held out of this piece to keep the spine focused on the revenue-share measure:

Method. The primary measure throughout is interest payments as a share of general government revenue, as tracked by the World Bank across 89 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) for its International Debt Report 2025. This is deliberately narrower than total debt service (interest plus principal) or debt service against exports or GDP — those are different, real measures that would tell a related but distinct story, and this piece does not blend them. Two figures are explicitly derived by this desk, not independently published: the "decade ago" interest levels in Exhibit 02, computed by dividing the current published figure by the Bank's own stated multiple (2.4× and 4× respectively) and shown as such in the caption. All other figures are as published by the cited source. No projection appears in this piece; Ethiopia's still-open restructuring in Exhibit 03 is a measured, current status, not a forecast.
Sources. Numbered, highest tier first; each inline citation points here.
  1. T1World Bank, "Beyond the narratives: what the IDR 2025 data reveal about debt in low- and middle-income countries," Data Blog, 17 Feb 2026. blogs.worldbank.org. Retrieved 23 Jul 2026.
  2. T2OMFIF, "Distressed LICs need debt relief, not more new debt," citing IMF debt sustainability analyses, 27 Nov 2024. omfif.org. Retrieved 23 Jul 2026.
  3. T1World Bank, "Developing countries paid record $1.4 trillion on foreign debt in 2023," International Debt Report 2024 press release, 3 Dec 2024. worldbank.org. Retrieved 23 Jul 2026.
  4. T1G20, "Note: Steps of a debt restructuring under the Common Framework," 2025; tralac Trade Law Centre, "The G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments: Limits of Reform." g20.org.za; tralac.org. Retrieved 23 Jul 2026.
  5. T2ODI, "Common framework, uncommon challenges: lessons from the post-COVID debt restructuring architecture." odi.org. Retrieved 23 Jul 2026.
  6. T1International Monetary Fund, "Debt Vulnerabilities in Low-Income Countries," IMF Policy Paper PPEA2025038, Oct 2025. imf.org. Retrieved 23 Jul 2026.
Corrections. None. Material corrections will be logged here with date.
Figures to 24 Jul 2026. Noodle News · v1.0 · debt-service-revenue-share.